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Abstract 
 
For the past forty years, researchers studied the relationship between mental disorder and 
terrorist involvement. The literature developed in four paradigms, each of which differs 
in terms of their empirical evidence, the specific mental disorders studied, and their 
conceptualizations of terrorist involvement. These paradigms have not, however, 
witnessed linear and incremental improvements upon one another. Although one 
paradigm has generally tended to dominate a temporal period, many false assumptions 
and incorrect interpretations of earlier work permeate into today’s discourse. This paper 
provides a history of the study of mental disorders and the terrorist. First, we briefly 
outline the core fundamental principles of the first two paradigms, The paper then 
outlines the core arguments produced by the seminal reviews conducted in paradigm 
three. We highlight how these findings were consistently misinterpreted in subsequent 
citations. We then highlight recent innovations in the study of terrorism and mental 
disorder since the various influential literature reviews of 1997-2005. We conclude by 
outlining how future research in this area may improve in the coming years by 
broadening our understanding of both terrorist involvement and psychopathology away 
from simple dichotomous thinking. 
 
Keywords: terrorism, terrorist involvement, mental disorders 
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Introduction 
The study of mental disorders’ relationship with terrorist engagement spans over forty 
years. It experienced four paradigms of conceptual and empirical development. During 
this time, the explanatory emphasis of mental illness lurched from the center of 
psychological enquiry to the periphery. For example, many early studies posited specific 
mental disorders as causal (Cooper, 1978; Pearce, 1977). Decades later, many studies not 
only rejected earlier causal assumptions but also downplayed the presence of mental 
disorders amongst terrorists in the first place (Abrahms, 2011; Post 2005, 2007; Sher & 
Rice, 2015). Small seeds of work recently found a middle ground where mental disorders 
are just one factor amongst many but not for all terrorists everywhere. 
 
These four paradigms differed from one another in terms of their empirical evidence, the 
specific mental disorders studied, and their conceptualizations of terrorist involvement. It 
would be incorrect, however, to characterize these four paradigms of development as 
linear and incremental improvements upon one another. Instead, many false assumptions 
and incorrect interpretations of earlier work permeate into today’s discourse. In other 
cases, the incorrect assumptions of earlier paradigms of work still linger. Although one 
paradigm has generally tended to dominate a temporal period, overlaps are common. 
Lacking in empirical evidence, the first paradigm offered psychopathy as a cause of 
terrorist involvement. It focused upon individual drives and characterized terrorist 
involvement as a yes/no dichotomy (e.g. a subject was either a terrorist or not). The 
second paradigm instead turned the psychopathological focus away from psychopathy 
toward specific personality types.  
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The third paradigm synthesized the existing evidence base and rightly questioned the 
causative nature and prevalence of psychopathy and specific personality types. Simple 
misinterpretations of these reviews led to some commonly held false generalizations 
within the literature. These misinterpretations subsequently built a false dichotomy 
around mental disorders and terrorist involvement. The fourth paradigm, spurred on by 
analogous innovations within the study of the terrorist, is starting to find a middle ground 
between the hardcore line adopted by paradigms one and two and the mistaken 
assumptions that followed seminal reviews of paradigm 3. This latest paradigm is 
characterized by its empiricism, and understanding that terrorist involvement is a 
complex process (e.g. terrorist involvement is usually the outcome of a pathway 
involvement multiple push/pull factors and that the meaning of terrorist involvement may 
differ across roles within the group; Horgan, 2005; Gill 2012).  
 
This paper provides a history of the study of mental disorders and the terrorist. First, we 
briefly outline the core fundamental principles of paradigms one and two. These are 
covered in far greater detail elsewhere, so this paper will only provide the basic 
assumptions and briefly assess the social scientific rigor of these studies. The paper then 
outlines the core arguments produced by the seminal reviews conducted in paradigm 
three. Most importantly, it shows how subsequent citations often misinterpreted these 
findings. We then highlight recent innovations in the study of terrorism and mental 
disorder since the various influential reviews of 1997-2005. We conclude by outlining 
that the future of research on terrorist psychology lies in moving away from overly 
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reductionist approaches that dichotomize the two extremes of terrorist involvement (e.g. 
terrorist vs. non-terrorist) and/or mental disorder (e.g. psychopath vs. non-psychopath) 
and instead embrace approaches that view both as continuums. 
Paradigm 1 – Psychopathy as Key 
Many early published analyses on the terrorist placed psychopathy as the core 
explanatory variable. This speculative opinion was derived mainly from popular culture, 
and the desire to attribute mental disorders to those committing such heinous, violent acts 
(Victoroff, 2005). It remained decades before factors such as group processes and the 
wider social environment received attention. To this end, researchers postulated deviant 
characteristics of the terrorist. Pearce (1977) viewed them as sociopaths due to gaps in 
self-monitoring. He speculated engaging in an extremist cause provides an outlet for 
underlying mental health problems. Pearce based his conclusion on an analysis of the 
tattoos adorning one particular terrorist’s body. Cooper (1978) argued that terrorists 
possess psychopathic or sociopathic personalities, and if it were not for engaging in 
political violence, they would find another outlet for their violent impulses. Some of 
these arguments held sway for a number of years (and well into what we consider 
Paradigm 2’s golden years). For example, Tanay (1987) agrees with Cooper, arguing that 
terrorist acts are merely psychopathic tendencies hidden behind political rhetoric to 
provide the terrorist with an excuse to aggress. The lack of valid concepts and objective 
empirical research, alongside advancement of psychological research concerning 
psychopathy, and development of a widely accepted validated measure (Psychopathy 
Checklist; Hare, 1985) aided the gradual demise of the psychopath-as-terrorist theory. 
This permitted other psychological theories to come to the fore. 
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Paradigm 2 – Personality as Key 
Psychoanalytical perspectives largely took over from studies focused upon psychopathy 
and the terrorist. Psychoanalysis reveals the relationship between conscious and 
unconscious thought and focuses upon psychological development from childhood. The 
findings from this paradigm are reasonably similar to the above assumptions of the 
terrorist being essentially abnormal. However, the abnormality is determined by 
unconscious motives and impulses spanning from childhood maltreatment, holding roots 
in Freud’s Oedipus complex (Borum, 2004).  
Many studies in this paradigm highlighted various aspects of personality, with narcissism 
the most common. Narcissists possess an over-inflated sense of self to the effect that they 
feel superior to others, possess volatile self-esteem, have interpersonal problems, and are 
prone to aggression in response to ego threats (Hogg & Vaughan, p.136). Narcissistic 
injuries, caused by early emotional injuries, lead to a damaged sense of self in adulthood. 
Incapable of overcoming these early emotional experiences, the individual directs his/her 
anger toward other targets held to be responsible. Again, these arguments held sway 
across paradigms. Twelve years apart, both Lasch (1979) and Pearlstein (1991) asserted 
that narcissism is key to understanding the terrorist personality. For Pearlstein (1991), 
terrorists utilize their “narcissistic rage” in undertaking their duties. He goes as far to 
claim that narcissism provides the most complete and “intellectually satisfying theory 
regarding the personal logic of political terrorism”.  
One of the earliest empirical studies into the terrorist personality was carried out on 
German extremist movements in the 1970s. The Analysen zum Terrorismus included 
comprehensive interviews and analyses of 250 terrorist careers (Jäger, Schmidtchen, & 
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Süllwold, 1981). The results demonstrated 25% of actors had lost one or both parents in 
early life and 33% reported severe conflict with their parents (Post, 1984). Subsequent 
research speculated further, highlighting issues like parental abuse (Kent & Nicholls, 
1977), deviance within the family system (Bollinger, 1985), the inability to identify with 
a father figure (Billig, 1985), and the experience of tyrannical fathers (De Cataldo 
Neuberger & Valentini, 1996). Despite the popularity of the notion that terrorists were 
often reticent, psychologically damaged youths, the theory lacked empirical strength. 
Morf’s (1970) clinical examinations of Front for the Liberation of Quebec prisoners, 
highlighted failings inherent in this research strand: No statistical data, no standardized 
psychological instruments, and no control group (Victoroff, 2005).  
Paradigm 3 – Synthesizing the Evidence 
At the end of the 1990’s and the early years of the new Millennium, a series of scholarly 
outputs synthesized the existing evidence surrounding psychopathological or personality-
driven explanations of terrorist involvement (Borum, 2004; Horgan, 2003, 2005; 
Victoroff, 2005; Silke, 1998, 2003). These reviews largely agreed with one another. 
Collectively, they questioned the “empirical, theoretical and conceptual foundations” of 
earlier studies (Horgan, 2003, p.23).  
 
On theoretical grounds, they argued investigations centering on psychopathy and/or 
personality disorders clearly suffer from the fundamental attribution error (Hogg & 
Vaughan, 2005). This error is a basic human tendency to use dispositions as an 
explanatory variable for behavior while underestimating the powerful impact of the 
situational context within which the individual behaves. This type of research focuses too 
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much on the actions of the terrorist rather than the processes through which the individual 
became a terrorist. The reviews are not saying there are no terrorists who are psychopaths 
or narcissists but rather it is too simple (and unsupported) to suggest these factors caused 
the initial engagement with terrorism alone.  
 
On empirical grounds, the reviews consistently found little support for the argument that 
psychopathy drives terrorist behavior. For Horgan (2003, p.6), “there remains little to 
support the argument that terrorists can or should be necessarily regarded as psychopathic 
owing to the nature of the offences committed”. Similarly, the reviews questioned the 
empirical foundations of the personality strand of research. Horgan (2003, p.10) 
highlights that “attempts to assert the presence of a terrorist personality, or profile, are 
pitiful”. Silke (2003, p.32) similarly outlines, “quite simply, the best of the empirical 
work does not suggest, and never has suggested, that terrorists possess a distinct 
personality or that their psychology is somehow deviant from that of ‘normal’ people”. 
Victoroff (2005, p.12) notes that “the conclusion, at least on the basis of uncontrolled 
empirical psychological studies…has been that terrorists do not usually exhibit what we 
refer to as Axis I or even Axis II psychiatric disorders”. Victoroff (2005, p.3) further 
characterizes the research in paradigms one and two as “theoretical speculation based on 
subjective interpretation of anecdotal observations”. It is important to carefully re-read 
these conclusions. Psychopathy and personality disorders were found to be unsupported 
empirically. Later, we show that many citations of these studies largely misinterpreted 
these conclusions and instead generalized to psychopathology in general.  
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Despite a commonly held belief in subsequent studies, these reviews were not arguing 
people with pathological disorders do not join terrorist groups. For example, Horgan 
(2003, p.7) outlines that “perhaps, if the opportunity ever arose to examine actual 
terrorists in clinical settings, there might be some evidence to link at least a few of the 
‘sore thumbs’ with pathological disorders”. Instead, they argue that the prevalence rates 
of various mental disorders are no different to those found in general society. Horgan 
(2003, p.17) cites McCauley (1991, p.132) as being “precise” in his assertion that “[this] 
is not to say that there is no pathology among terrorists, but the rate of diagnosable 
pathology, at least, does not differ significantly from control groups of the same age and 
background”. Silke (2003, p.32) agrees by asserting he “is not saying that mentally 
unbalanced or pathological personalities are never present in terrorist organizations”. 
Victoroff (2005, p.14) outlines that “sociopaths may sometimes be among the terrorists”. 
On a related note, the reviews largely agree that when psychopathic members are present 
they are either likely to take up specific roles within the movement (Victoroff, 2005), or 
be on the fringes (Silke, 2003).  
 
The reviews regularly cite studies that affirm the lack of difference between terrorist and 
control groups in terms of disorder prevalence. Horgan (2003, p.18) notes a “persistence 
of evidence to suggest terrorist normality”. Silke also utilizes the word ‘normal’ on a 
couple of occasions. For example, “most serious researchers in the field at least 
nominally agree with the position that terrorists are essentially normal individuals” 
(1998, p.53). By ‘normal’, these reviews meant terrorists were no more or less likely to 
experience particular mental disorders than the average person on the street. They did not 
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mean terrorists never suffer from mental disorders, yet that is frequently the way 
subsequent citations understood these particular sentences (we return to this in the next 
section). Indeed, a couple of the reviews even cite the Lyons and Harbinson (1986) study 
of Northern Irish terrorists where 16% suffered from a form of mental illness.  
 
These reviews became very influential within the literature that followed, amassing over 
1800 citations at the time of writing. They also coincided in time with a large uptake in 
the number of published terrorist-related articles (Silke, 2015). However, many of these 
citations misunderstood the finer points. Whereas the reviews often used very specific 
language, the citations generalized to a higher level of abstraction and overlooked many 
of the nuances. In turn, this led to the false assumption that there was no relationship 
whatsoever between mental disorders and terrorist involvement. This had major 
implications for both government practice and media portrayal of terrorist and mass 
casualty events. The point of the reviews was not to firmly put an end to studies of mental 
disorder and terrorist involvement. Rather, they intended to highlight the problems with 
existing studies and to argue for less simplistic linear assumptions between experiencing 
particular mental disorders and terrorist engagement. 
 
Many citations of these reviews made four common errors. These errors relate to (a) how 
mental disorders were characterized (b) the conflation between the mental illness and 
irrationality (c) how the terrorist is characterized and (d) the dismissal of mental disorder 
presence. 
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Let's start with how citations incorrectly conceived mental disorders. The early studies of 
paradigms one and two looked at very specific mental and personality disorders. The 
seminal reviews, each conducted by a psychologist, are equally very careful around the 
language they use. For example, Horgan’s (2003) study debunks the empiricism behind 
the claim of a relationship between psychopathy and terrorist involvement. The chapter is 
not about mental illness in general. It is largely about psychopathy. ‘Psychopathy’ is 
mentioned 11 times, ‘mental illness’ just twice. Psychopathy is a very precise diagnosis 
of mental illness, with specific impairments of self and interpersonal functioning, and 
pathological personality traits including antagonism and disinhibition not found across 
other disorders. Victoroff’s (2005) synthesis is equally careful. He explicitly refers to 
Axis I and Axis II disorders and insanity criteria. 
 
However, the citations were not so specific. A lot of the nuance of paradigms one to three 
was lost in the citations the seminal reviews acquired. In many cases, they erred toward 
generalizations like ‘mental illness’ rather than the specific disorders analyzed in the 
reviews. In other cases, researchers (mainly non-psychologists) referred to 
‘psychopathology’ (the scientific study of mental disorder) as if it meant something else 
entirely (e.g. psychopathy). On other occasions, they clearly linked the presence of 
mental disorder with irrationality. In using such sweeping generalizations, these citations 
clearly misunderstood the earlier reviews. Instead, these citations were blind to the fact 
that clinical diagnoses of mental health problems span a wide range, from common 
mental health disorders such as depression to severe pathology such as schizophrenia as 
well as disorders of personality and neurodevelopment. Table 1 highlights a small 
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selection of these misconceptions. Each sentence in table 1 cites at least one of the 
seminal reviews to back up their position (emphasis is added to each sentence).  
[INSERT TABLE 1 AROUND HERE] 
  
This lack of specificity largely led to the second widely held misconception; the 
conflation of mental disorder with irrationality. The seminal reviews largely made the 
case that psychopaths are likely weeded out in the selection process for a number of 
reasons. Many citations then make the uninformed leap to assume that this is applicable 
to all mental disorders. For example, Zartman (2007, p.246) assessed terrorists as “not 
mad but highly rational and strategic calculators”. Wilson et al. (2010, p.691) stated, 
“terrorists are not characterized by mental disorder… [and instead are]…like many other 
criminals…rational decision makers”. More recently, a textbook on forensic psychology 
includes the claim that “there is little research to show that terrorists are mentally 
disturbed, which makes sense, as such an individual would be a liability to the cause” 
(Taylor, 2015).  Post (2009, p.14) cites both Horgan (2005) and Silke (2003) in making 
the claim that “terrorist groups attempt to screen out emotionally disturbed recruits” 
(emphasis added). McDonald (2013, p.38), citing Silke, outlines that “people with 
psychological disorders do not make good terrorists. They lack the discipline, rationality, 
self-control and mental stamina needed if terrorists are to survive any length of time”.  
 
Some of this stems from stigmatizing views of mental illness. “It has often been assumed 
that mentally ill assailants… have motives so irrational that they cannot be understood or 
have no motives other than their illness” (Fein & Vossekuil, 1999, p. p.328). The existing 
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evidence suggests otherwise. Gill, Horgan, and Deckert (2014) highlight that lone-actors 
diagnosed with mental illness frequently display rational motives and engage in rational 
and purposive pre-attack behaviors. Borum (2013) notes numerous mentally ill lone-
actors who were capable of sophisticated attack planning. Fein and Vossekuil (1999) also 
found evidence of mentally ill individuals planning, and executing attack related 
behaviors, as effectively as non-mentally ill actors. Corner and Gill (2015) empirically 
compared a sample of mentally disordered lone-actor terrorists with a sample of non-
mentally disordered lone-actor terrorists. They found that those who were mentally 
disordered were just as (and in some cases more) likely to engage in a range of rational 
pre-attack behaviors as those who were not. Mentally disordered offenders were more 
likely to express violent desires, seek legitimization for their intended actions, stockpile 
weapons, train, carry out a successful attack, kill and injure, discriminate in their 
targeting, and claim responsibility. Most of these traits are typically viewed as rational 
behaviors and essential for success.  
 
The third misconception is that the citations treat terrorism, and more importantly what it 
means to be a terrorist, in an aggregated, often generic fashion. They fail to acknowledge 
that being a bomb-maker may be different than being a bomb-planter; that being a foreign 
fighter may differ from being a terrorist attacking the homeland; that being a terrorist 
financier may be different than being a gunman; and that being a lone-actor may be 
different than being a group-actor. Their roles, functions, expectations, and experiences 
may differ in terms of recruitment, (self-) selection, routine activities whilst ‘being’ a 
terrorist and ultimately disengagement. This is a surprisingly almost universally adopted 
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position for two reasons. First, it is actually a sign of the field’s conceptual regression. 
Earlier paradigms often hypothesized psychological differences between leaders and 
followers for example (Strenz, 1981, 1988; Post, 1987). Somewhere in the subsequent 
spike in terrorist related publications, nuance became lost with the exception of a few 
studies. Second, one of the highly influential literature reviews made the call for such 
disaggregated approaches. Victoroff (2005, p.5) argued that “terrorist groups typically 
exhibit hierarchical organization, with various roles…[that]…may attract individuals 
with different predispositions who perhaps play their roles because of profoundly 
different psychological factors” and that “any empirical study claiming to characterize 
‘the psychology of terrorists’ might be very misleading if it fails to stratify its findings 
according to level and role”.  
 
Finally, many citations assume that because of the flaws inherent in the early studies, 
there is no mental disorder prevalence whatsoever and that it can not be linked to why 
(alongside many other factors) some individuals in some groups engage in terrorism. 
What the reviews show is the lack of scientific rigor behind these studies. They generally 
do not point toward scientific evidence to the contrary. The studies that are regularly 
cited as confirming the absence of mental disorders are potentially not as scientific or 
rigorously examined to the same degree as those confirming a relationship. Merari (2010, 
p.253-254) eloquently sums up this misconception: 
By and large, the opinion that terrorists do not have a common psychological profile rests on the 
absence of research rather than on direct findings. A scientifically sound conclusion that terrorists 
have no common personality traits must be based on many comparative studies of terrorists from 
different countries and functions, using standard psychological tests and clinical interviews. As 
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such studies have not been published, the only scientifically sound conclusion for now is that we 
do not know whether terrorists share common traits, but we cannot be sure that such traits do not 
exist. 
 
Paradigm 4 – Pathways, Disaggregation & Continuums  
Although still in its infancy, the field of study has undoubtedly improved in terms of its 
theoretical, conceptual and empirical rigor since the publication of the seminal literature 
reviews. Horgan (2014) notes an increase in “solid, quality research output” aided by a 
growth in full-time dedicated researchers and, relatedly, research funding from a variety 
of government sources. Many of these improvements led to some changes in thought 
surrounding mental disorder and terrorism. Conceptually, the best pieces of research no 
longer seek silver bullet mono-causal explanations but instead embrace the complexity of 
what terrorist involvement means. Empirically, the prevalence of mental disorders has 
been highlighted on a number of occasions. Sub-group comparisons also demonstrated 
that some terrorist types more likely suffered mental disorders than others. The following 
sub-sections outline some of these innovations and what it means for the study of 
psychopathology and terrorism.   
 
“From Profiles to Pathways” 
Horgan (2008) outlines what a psychological contribution toward the understanding the 
terrorist involves. He champions a pathway process involving three phases: becoming 
involved, being involved, and disengaging. Whereas the vast majority of research had 
focused upon the first phase, such theorizing opened the field of study to largely 
overlooked areas. Whereas the approaches outlined in paradigms one and two above 
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focus on ‘why’ individuals become members of militant groups, pathway approaches 
mostly focus on ‘how’ individuals become members. Shaw (1986) published the very 
first such ‘pathway model’ these authors are aware of. It comprised four elements and the 
dominant explanation of the day (narcissism) heavily influenced it. The four elements 
comprised socialization processes, narcissistic injuries, escalatory events and personal 
connections with militant group members. Whilst pathway models are now quite 
common, the potential role of mental disorder or personality types often goes 
unmentioned thus mirroring the dominant social-psychological explanations of today. 
However, mental disorders or personality factors might possibly be subsumed as a subset 
of behavior like contextual factors such as early experiences, cognitive-social factors like 
risk taking and reduced social contact (Taylor and Horgan, 2006), radicalizing through 
personal victimization (McCauley and Moskalenko, 2011) or displacement of aggression 
(Moghaddam, 2005).  
The pathway approach broadens the horizons of research regarding mental disorder and 
terrorist involvement. A couple of the highly influential reviews mentioned earlier 
highlight this fact but follow-up studies were slow to emerge. For example, Horgan 
(2003, p.6) outlines that the regularly stressful experience of ‘being’ a terrorist may lead 
to psychological suffering. This echoed Ferracuti’s (1982) earlier claims. Weatherston 
and Moran (2003, p.702) also argue that signs of mental disorder in terrorists may be due 
to involvement in terror activity and its associated risks: 
“If the presence of mental disorders is detected in a terrorist, it cannot be 
concluded that the mental disorder was the cause of terrorist activity. In addition, 
those terrorists who have been subject to detailed psychiatric assessment have 
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been examined under conditions of incarceration, and therefore the circumstances 
of their arrest and detention in producing mental disorder need to be considered.” 
 
So in other words, rather than being a cause of involvement, psychological problems may 
be a by-product of involvement. Weatherston and Moran go on to describe how lifestyle 
and group conflict are fundamental variables that may contribute to mental disorder 
emergence in terrorists. Exposure to such conditions is not necessarily conducive to 
developing mental disorder in every case, but these factors do have the potential to 
contribute to mental disorder in particular individuals. This is a potentially ripe avenue 
for future research in the psychology of terrorism. 
 
The terrorist lifestyle obviously involves exposure to violent and traumatic situations. 
Studies of analogous behaviors like engaging in war or participating within a gang 
highlight that such violent and traumatic situations may lead to psychological problems. 
For example, conflict experience has induced post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) in 
individuals (Jordan et al., 1991). This disorder is recognized as manifesting in those 
considered to have no history of mental disorder (Weatherston & Moran, 2003). Burton, 
Foy, Bwanausi, Johnson, and Moore (1994) examined subsequent impact on 
psychological functioning  from gang violence amongst juveniles. 24% met clinical 
criteria for diagnosis of PTSD following exposure to various aspects of gang related 
lifestyle. Autobiographical evidence from former terrorist actors also describes how roles 
and experiences within an organization impact upon their psychological health (Adair, 
2009; Collins, 1998; Moloney, 2010). The stressors, pressures, and conflict present 
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within a terrorist organization can also play a part in inducing psychological 
complications.  
Psychological stress may also help induce disengagement from a terrorist group. Reinares 
(2011) interviewed 35 former members of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA). Some 
members voluntarily left due to ‘personal’ reasons. Reinares does not elaborate in detail 
how ‘personal reasons’ are characterized other than mentioning a former female member 
who was motivated to leave the organization due to fatigue and “existential crisis” (p. 
799). Altier, Leonard, Shortland, and Horgan (2015) do expand on ‘personal reasons’. In 
their statistical analyses of terrorist autobiographies, they include burnout, psychological 
distress, fear, regret, coping, experience of being a victim, and physiological distress as 
various ‘push factors’ from terrorist groups. Bubolz and Simi (2015) interviewed 34 
former white supremacists. 32% self-reported mental health problems either prior to or 
during their involvement in a hate group. 44% self-reported suicidal ideation. 58% 
suffered from alcohol and substance abuse.  
 
Despite the lack of consensus concerning mental state affecting an individual’s decision 
to disengage from an organization, successful deradicalization programs provide 
psychological aid to those leaving a group. Boucek (2008) describes the Saudi Arabian 
government program, which includes an expansive counseling course run by 
approximately 50 mental health professionals and researchers. Mullins (2010) describes 
Singapore’s program, which includes Cognitive Behavioral Therapy, (Rabasa, 
Pettyjohnn, Ghez, and Boucek, 2010) and the US program in Iraq that addresses 
psychological issues experienced during conflict. Rabasa et al. (2010) evaluate a number 
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of programs across the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Europe. They conclude the most 
effective programs offer varying types of counseling (psychological, social, familial). 
This suggests practitioners should concern themselves with potential psychological issues 
occurring during participation in terrorism. This coupled with the lack of research 
concerning the psychological effects of being involved in an organization necessitates 
further investigation. In order to increase our understanding of desistance and 
deradicalization, the psychological impact of maintaining a terrorist lifestyle requires 
attention.  
Another crucial by-product of pathway processes is the growth in maturity in terms of 
explaining behavior. Rather than seeking explanation mono-causally (e.g. psychopathy), 
there is an acknowledgement that radicalization and engagement in terrorism is likely a 
culmination of several risk factors crystalizing in time and place. Rather than focusing 
upon solely the ‘causes’ of terrorist engagement, it may lead us to try understand ‘the 
causes of the causes’. This is where understanding the role of mental disorder may 
become more useful in specific subsets of terrorist behavior. For example, Gill’s (2015) 
work on lone-actor terrorists highlights several cases where the individual experience of 
mental disorders acted as a background risk factor and combined with a number of more 
proximal stressors, pushed the individual towards radicalization. This is backed up in 
Corner and Gill’s (2015) inferential analysis that compared a sample of mentally 
disordered lone-actor terrorists with a sample of non-mentally disordered lone-actors. 
The former group was significantly more likely to experience a recent stressor prior to 
planning their terrorist attack. For the purpose of threat management and/or risk 
assessment, solely focusing upon a static indicator like presence of a mental disorder is 
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therefore useless in the absence of also looking at how it interplays with dynamic 
indicators like recent stressors.  
 
Expanding Psychopathological Approaches  
Rather than solely focusing upon psychopathy or specific personality disorders (like in 
paradigms 1 and 2), some recent studies looked at the full range of Diagnostic Mental 
Disorders. This is a very important development. Specificity matters. For too long, the 
terrorist psychology literature (and interpretations of it) was held back by narrow, linear 
understandings that focused upon prediction and linear thinking. Disorders vary greatly 
yet many analyses regarding terrorism treated them equally. This false dichotomy of 
mentally ill versus terrorist led to a stagnant debate. The innovation is also important in 
terms of both early prevention and, if necessary, later risk assessment. By denying that 
mental health issues ever play a role, it casts aside a potential key partner in safeguarding 
people at risk of radicalization and those who need psychological support post-
disengagement.  
 
Four studies, in particular, are worth mentioning because of the data utilized, the span of 
psychopathology under study and the incorporation of some form of comparison or 
control group to get a sense of base rates. Weenink (2015) studied police files of 140 
Dutch individuals who became foreign fighters. 6% had diagnosed disorders. These 
disorders included psychotic, narcissistic, AD/HD, ADD, schizophrenia, autism 
spectrum, and post-traumatic stress. Weenink outlines the prevalence of schizophrenia 
and psychosis within this sample is higher than the general population. A further 20% of 
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cases displayed indications of mental health problems but were undiagnosed at any point 
in their life. In Corner, Gill, and Mason’s (2015) sample of 153 lone-actor terrorists, 
1.3% experienced Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), 0.7% drug dependence, 8.5% 
schizophrenia, 0.7% schizoaffective disorder, 2.0% delusional disorder, 0.7% psychotic 
disorder, 7.2% depression, 3.9% bipolar disorder, 1.3% unspecified anxiety disorder, 
0.7% dissociative disorder, 1.3% Obsessive Compulsive Disorder (OCD), 3.3% Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), 0.7% unspecified sleep disorder, 6.5% unspecified 
personality disorder, and 3.3% autism spectrum disorder. Three disorders exhibited a 
higher prevalence in the lone-actor sample than in the general population (schizophrenia, 
delusional disorder, autism spectrum disorders). Three disorders exhibited a lower 
prevalence in the lone-actor sample than in the general population (depression, sleep 
disorders, and learning disabilities). Both studies highlight the higher proportion of 
schizophrenia within their samples compared to the wider population. It is important to 
note however that neither sample is representative of the vast majority of terrorists. 
Whilst foreign fighters and lone-actors hold much of the media’s attention right now, 
they are still in the vast minority compared to terrorists globally and across history.   
 
Corner and Gill (2015) utilized a sample of 119 lone-actor terrorists and investigated 
whether certain behaviors were more likely to co-occur with certain diagnoses than 
others. Those diagnosed with schizophrenia and associated disorders were the only 
diagnostic group to be significantly associated with previous violent behavior and this 
supports past research in the general violence literature (Krakowski et al, 1986). Negative 
associations were also found between personality disorders and autism and having a 
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spouse/partner involved in a terror movement, which may be indicative of not having a 
spouse due to the detrimental nature of these disorders. Because mental disorders often 
share symptoms, further research may also focus upon analyzing symptoms of mental 
illness rather than purely the diagnoses themselves (Douglas, Guy & Hart, 2009). 
 
Finally, Gottschalk and Gottschalk (2004) administered a widely used psychometric test 
of personality and psychopathology (the MMPI-2) to 90 incarcerated Palestinian and 
Israeli terrorists and to control groups of Palestinians and Israeli Jews matched on 
demographic features. The terrorist sample scored higher on subscale measures 
psychopathic deviate, paranoid, depressive, schizophrenic, and hypomanic tendencies. 
Although these results are interesting, there may be some measurement issues to think 
about. First, we do not know whether these subscale measures are a result of previous 
terrorist engagement or the result of incarceration or whether they played any role in the 
decision to become a terrorist. Second, cross-cultural and national comparability of the 
construct validity of self-report tests like MMPI-2 is still highly debatable. Third, sample 
sizes remain quite low for broad based generalizations.  
 
These four studies collectively show that the study of mental disorder and terrorist 
involvement is not necessarily ‘fruitless’. They each involved some form of control and 
comparison group and demonstrated clear differences. None of them claim mental 
disorders as a predictor for terrorist involvement. Nor do they claim a linear relationship 
between specific personality traits or specific mental disorders and terrorist engagement. 
Rather, they treat these factors as just one amongst many that typically crystalize within 
There and Back Again  
 23 
the individual. Such studies are only at the beginning and it is still far too early for 
generalizations.     
 
Disaggregating the Terrorist 
The study of the terrorist has recently become more disaggregated also. Now we are more 
likely to see studies of specific sub-types of terrorist actor (e.g. lone-actor, suicide 
bomber, foreign fighter). As Monahan (2012) notes, terrorism studies used to diverge 
greatly from wider criminological studies who instead of “lumping” all forms of 
criminality into one outcome variable (e.g. the criminal) would typically “split” the 
outcome variable (e.g. the arsonist, the sexual offender). This has led to some interesting 
findings with relation to mental disorder prevalence within various terrorist sub-samples 
(as anticipated in Victoroff’s review of the literature in 2005).  
 
Four studies compared the rates of mental disorders in lone actors to matched samples of 
group actors. Gruenewald et al. (2013) compared far-right group and lone offenders, 
finding the latter significantly more likely to experience them (40.4% vs. 7.6%). Hewitt’s 
(2003) sample of lone-actors from an array of ideological backgrounds found similar 
results (22% vs. 8.1%) although the prevalence rate was almost half the rate found in the 
Gruenewald et al. study. Corner and Gill (2015) compared 119 lone-actor terrorists with 
428 group-based actors. Using odds-ratios they found lone-actor terrorists were 13.5 
times more likely to have a history of mental illness than group-based actors. Corner, Gill 
and Mason (2015) examined these results further and found a negative correlation 
between the level of co-offending and the rate of mental disorder prevalence. Whereas 
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their sample of lone-actor terrorists included over 40% with a history of mental disorders, 
the figure for solo-terrorists (e.g. those who carried out their attack alone but received 
support from a wider terrorist group) was around 20%, for dyads it was just over 5% and 
for group-based actors it was less than 3%.  
 
Merari and colleagues carried out various psychological tests on a sample of suicide 
bombers and compared the results with various control groups (e.g. other terrorists and 
non-political criminals) (Merari, 2010; Merari, Diamant, et al., 2009; Merari, Fighel, et 
al., 2009). These studies employed a range of techniques including clinical interviews, 
personality tests, the Thematic Apperception Test, and the House-Tree-Person Drawing 
test. Compared to the control group, the suicide bomber group received significantly 
more diagnoses of Avoidant-Dependent Personality Disorder (60% vs. 17%), depressive 
symptoms (53% vs. 8%) and more readily displayed suicidal tendencies (40% vs. 0%). 
On the other hand, the control group was more likely to contain members with 
psychopathic tendencies (25% vs. 0%) and impulsive-unstable tendencies (67% vs. 27%). 
Suicide bomber organizers scored higher in ego-strength, impulsivity and emotional 
instability than would-be suicide bombers.  
Again these studies highlight that once the multiplicity of terrorist roles is examined, 
fascinating research emerges. The rigor of the lone-actor studies and the consistency in 
their findings suggests that these results are highly reliable. The data utilized in the 
suicide bomber study is largely unparalleled. However, we still know very little about 
other specific roles. Is there anything that differentiates the bomb-planter from the bomb-
maker for example? Are there selection effects at play whereby recruiters place certain 
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people in certain roles or is it self-selection whereby would-be recruits push for particular 
positions? What role, if any, does personality play in these dynamics?  
 
Conclusion 
In the months and years that followed 9/11, the terrorism studies literature grew 
enormously. The clamor for quick answers often led to simple questions, simple 
frameworks and linear thinking. Rather than treating both terrorism and psychopathology 
for the complex and multifaceted issues that they are, many analyses reached for the most 
aggregate and static interpretations. Instead of understanding the complexities behind 
different diagnoses, the term ‘mentally ill’ and others like it were often adopted. Instead 
of understanding that terrorist groups are made up of a wide-range of behaviors, members 
and functions, analyses typically sought to understand the ‘terrorist’ as if they were all 
similar. It is unsurprising that when such straightforward thinking dominated, 
straightforward answers like ‘there is no relationship at all’ became a common mantra 
within the literature. This all occurred even in the presence of several rigorous syntheses 
of the evidence base that made very carefully crafted, well-argued and nuanced 
conclusions. Instead, the conclusions and recommendations of these reviews were swept 
aside or largely misinterpreted. A false dichotomy prevailed that an act of targeted public 
violence was either carried out by a terrorist or a mentally disordered individual.  
 
Fortunately many studies recently moved away from such dichotomized thinking and this 
is where the future of the field lies. Consistently the results highlight differences in 
prevalence rates across specific disorders within terrorist samples against comparison and 
control groups and across aggregate disorder prevalence rates within terrorist sub-
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samples (e.g. lone versus group offenders). Interesting, albeit parallel work not 
specifically focused upon psychopathology also highlights the experiences of 
psychological problems over the life course of terrorist offending and later 
disengagement. The data sources are also varied from first-hand interviews, to the 
administering of psychometric testing, to court records and other open-source avenues. 
Simply, data unavailability is no longer an excuse for the terrorism studies field to use 
any longer. We need more research endeavors like those cited in the previous sections to 
provide a more vibrant field of research and debate instead of being a field that went from 
one extreme orthodoxy (e.g. they are all psychopaths) to another extreme orthodoxy (e.g. 
there is no relationship whatsoever). The incorporation of more psychologists into the 
research field would only develop this nuance greater particularly in investigations of 
motivation which remain shallow and unscientific compared to developments within the 
wider psychology literature.  
 
There are other major gaps in our knowledge too that require filling. No research has 
applied concepts around protective factors, mental disorders, and terrorism. Protective 
factors may come in many forms and include individual factors (e.g. attitudes, academic 
achievement, social orientation, self-control, personality factors), peer factors (e.g. close 
relationships with non-criminal peers, pro-social norms within peer group, number of 
affective relationships), and family factors (e.g. highly connected to family, involvement 
in social activities).  We also know very little about the temporal ordering of risk factors 
(of which the experience of a mental disorder may be one of dozens) across terrorists. 
Radicalization is a process and may vary from case to case yet there is a distinct lack of 
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studies aiming to quantify what these processes look like. We do not know, for example, 
what antecedent behaviors and experiences are real risk-factors for terrorist engagement, 
and which ones are simply a cause of a cause (e.g. a factor that might heighten certain 
vulnerabilities which may in turn push that person further down the extremist path and 
make them more likely to experience other risk factors). Without sequencing the 
behaviors, we can not know for sure. 
 
Given the misinterpretations of previous reviews of the literature, it is probably best to 
conclude with a clear (re-)statement of our position on a number of issues. It is not true 
that terrorists share a common psychological profile. The evidence suggests however that 
some types of terrorists may be more likely to possess certain psychological traits more 
than the general population. The evidence also suggests that some types of terrorists may 
also more likely possess certain psychological traits than other types of terrorists. The 
evidence also suggests that those terrorist sub-samples with high rates of mental health 
disorders still fall below 50%. No mental health disorder appears to be a predictor of 
terrorist involvement. Terrorism remains a very low base-rate activity. Instead, for some 
terrorists the experience of mental health disorders may be just one of many ‘risk’ factors 
that pushed and pulled that individual into terrorist engagement. The presence of mental 
disorders also may be a by-product of terrorist activity and/or later disengagement from a 
terrorist group. By considering multiple facets individual, social, and situational levels of 
analyses, terrorism research may be able to present valid, reliable evidence which aids in 
prevention and disruption of events carried out by terrorists with mental health problems. 
Terrorism is, and will remain, a contentious issue. Tempting as media headlines, citing 
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'expert opinion' that the cause of terrorism is "mental illness", may be, only with valid 
empirical data, and (re)interpretation of the value of current and historical evidence will 
the academic field move forward.   
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Table 1 – Misinterpretations of the Literature Reviews 
Author Quote (emphasis added) 
Abrahms 
(2011)  
“Psychological assessments of terrorists indicate that they are 
cognitively normal” 
Gupta (2012) Terrorists “by an large, seem to be free of diagnosable maladies of 
the mind” 
Jones and 
Bhui (2008) 
“We can be fairly certain that most of these individuals will not meet 
international diagnostic criteria for mental or personality 
disorders” 
Kruglanski 
and Fishman 
(2009) 
“The majority of such research points to the normality of individuals 
involved in terrorist organizations” 
Lakhani 
(2013) 
There is little evidence to suggest that the vast majority of terrorists 
hold any disturbed psychological symptoms, or that there exists an 
identifiable ‘terrorist personality’ 
Lutz and Lutz 
(2013) 
“Terrorists are not normally crazy or suffering from mental 
problems”. 
O’Gorman 
(2010) 
“Every study that has seriously examined the psychological state of 
terrorists finds that they fall within the bounds of normality” 
Post (2005) “The search for psychopathological origins is fruitless” 
Post (2007) “Horgan has emphasized that there are no individual psychological 
traits that distinguish terrorists from a general population” 
Sher and Rice 
(2015) 
“If the practices of certain terrorist organizations may be generalized 
to the practices of all, it appears that terrorist organizations reject 
recruits with signs and symptoms of psychopathology” 
Spaiij (2011) “Scholars such as Post and Horgan argue that, overall, terrorists 
should not be regarded as suffering from any identifiable 
psychopathology” 
 
